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Court News Ohio
Interstate
Prisoner Transfer Agreement Applies to Those Incarcerated in County
Jails
By Kathleen Maloney
February 19, 2015
A statute governing the transfer of prisoners between states to deal
with pending charges in another jurisdiction applies to inmates who
have begun serving sentences in county jails, the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled today.
The law incorporates an interstate compact that allows a jurisdiction
to bring a person to trial on pending charges when he or she is
incarcerated in another state. In a 5-2 decision, the court determined
that the phrase “penal or correctional institution of a party state” as
used in the agreement includes county jails.
The opinion, written by Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, affirmed the
judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and resolves a conflict
among appeals courts in the state.
Compact Among States
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), adopted in Ohio in 1969,
is an agreement among the federal government, 48 states, and the
District of Columbia. The compact’s provisions are reflected in R.C.
2963.30.
The agreement helps with the “expeditious and orderly disposition” of
pending criminal charges and provides cooperative procedures for
interstate transfers. It aims to ensure speedy-trial rights and to
minimize interference with prisoner rehabilitation. The procedures set
timeframes for bringing prisoners to trial once a request for transfer
has been made by a prisoner or a prosecutor.
One section of the statute and the IAD states that it applies to a
defendant who has started a term of imprisonment “in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state.”
Black’s Criminal Charges in Multiple Jurisdictions
James D. Black was awaiting sentencing in a Maryland county jail in
August 2010 when he was notified of pending criminal charges filed in
Ashland, Richland, and Franklin counties in Ohio. In February 2011, he
began serving a one-year sentence in a county detention center in
Maryland.
Black was transferred in May 2011 under the IAD from that facility to
Richland County to address charges there of receiving stolen property,
forgery, and tampering with evidence. While awaiting resolution of his
case in Richland County, he was transported to Ashland County for
arraignment on charges of theft and breaking and entering. He was
returned to Richland County for sentencing.
Before his trial was held in Ashland County, Black was sent on August
1, 2011, back to the Maryland county detention facility.
Black asked that the Ashland County case be dismissed because he was
not prosecuted in the timeframe required by R.C. 2963.30. He testified
that he could not participate in drug treatment or community programs
and was ineligible for parole in Maryland because the Ashland County
charges were unresolved. The trial court denied his request.
Eventually returning to Ohio, Black was arrested in Medina County and
then re-indicted in Ashland County. Following trial, he was convicted
and sentenced to a year in prison.
He appealed to the Fifth District, which reversed the conviction,
concluding that the IAD timeframes applied to Black while he was in
Maryland’s county jail. The Fifth District notified the Ohio Supreme
Court that its decision conflicted with one from the Eighth District
Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court agreed and accepted an appeal from the state. The
court combined the two cases for consideration.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
While prisons (state-run facilities) and jails (operated by counties)
are distinct in Ohio, Chief Justice O’Connor pointed out that the IAD
did not use either of those terms. In addition, neither the IAD nor the
Ohio Revised Code define “penal institution” or “correctional
institution,” she noted.
The court reasoned that the meaning of “penal or correctional
institution in a party state” is ambiguous in the interstate agreement.
Chief Justice O’Connor explained the interpretations of this language
from various courts throughout the country as well as the split among
Ohio appeals courts.
Noting that the IAD is required to be liberally construed to put the
purposes of the agreement into effect, she concluded, “The dual
purposes of the statute — expeditious and orderly disposition of
detainers filed in other jurisdictions and cooperative procedures for
inmate transfers — are best furthered by a broad application of the IAD
to any prisoner serving his or her sentence regardless of the facility
in which that sentence is being served. Accordingly, we conclude that
the term ‘penal or correctional institution of a party state’ in R.C.
2963.30 can encompass a county jail as well as a state prison or
correctional facility so long as the prisoner has begun serving his or
her sentence.”
“The uniformity we accomplish here is to resolve the conflict between
our appellate courts by interpreting the intent of the General Assembly
in enacting the IAD with the purpose of providing guidance to state
authorities and any defendant with charges pending here,” she added.
“In the absence of uniform federal guidance on the present issue, we
must interpret the language of R.C. 2963.30 to effectuate the intent of
the General Assembly in adopting the IAD.”
Joining Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion were Justices Paul E. Pfeifer,
Judith Ann Lanzinger, Judith L. French, and William M. O’Neill.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell dissented in an opinion joined by Justice
Sharon L. Kennedy.
Dissent
Justice O’Donnell concluded that “penal or correctional institution of
a party state” does not include county jails.
“In Article III(a), R.C. 2963.30, the General Assembly used the
prepositional phrase ‘of a party state’ to modify “penal or
correctional institution,” thereby indicating that the penal or
correctional institution belongs to, relates to, or is connected with
the state,” he concluded. “A plain reading of Ohio’s version of Article
III(a) shows that a penal or correctional facility of a political
subdivision is not included within its scope.”
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